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Abstract
Tax decentralisation should improve the efficiency of local governments and ultimately
boost output growth. The empirical evidence is however mixed. The current work looks
at two channels through which tax decentralisation may affect economic growth: labour
productivity and employment rate. The empirical analysis conducted on 20 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1980-2010 shows that the ultimate effect of fiscal decentralisation on
growth depends on which channel prevails, thus rendering the direct estimation of tax de-
centralisation on growth ambiguous. Tax decentralisation make the employment rate grow
faster, while it has either no effect of reduces labour productivity growth. When the analysis
is conducted using an IV approach with instruments based on institutional similarities and
geographic distance, the positive and significant effect on employment rate growth is offset
by the reduction of labour productivity growth, resulting in the absence of any statistically
significant effect on output growth.
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1 Introduction
The decentralisation of taxing powers is seen as a way of promoting the autonomy of local
governments, with the aim of improving the efficient provision of public goods, and ultimately
boost economic growth. One way in which tax decentralisation can affect output growth is in-
ducing competition among local jurisdictions for attracting mobile factors of production. Com-
petition could have beneficial effects on growth if it helps “taming” public sector expansion
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), or it facilitates an efficient allocation of resources when citizens
“vote with their feet” (Tiebout, 1956). Furthermore, Edwards (2005) shows that tax competition
would provide a strong incentive to local governments for investing in human capital; similarly,
Hatfield (2015) shows that capital mobility across jurisdictions induces local governments to im-
plement growth-friendly tax policies. At the same time, tax competition could harm growth if it
triggers a race to the bottom, resulting in under-provision of public goods and services (Zodrow
and Mieszkowski, 1986). Koethenbuerger and Lockwood (2010) argues that tax decentralisa-
tion would reduce growth and increase output volatility. Other theoretical models predict mixed
effects of tax competition on output growth (Rauscher, 2005, 2007).1
Since it is not possible to conclude whether tax decentralisation is growth-enhancing from
a theoretical perspective, the empirical literature has set on resolving this uncertainty. Results
are however mixed: some empirical studies find a positive correlation, few others a negative
one, and others no correlation at all. It may depend on differences in the way in which tax
decentralisation is defined and the way in which these empirical studies deal with the omitted
variable bias and reverse causality problem. The latter could be particularly problematic, given
the difficulty to find valid instruments for fiscal decentralisation indicators. However, there is the
possibility that the problem lies in the reduced-form model used in most of the literature, where
the impact of fiscal decentralisation on output growth is directly estimated. These empirical
studies do not consider the channels through which tax decentralisation affects output growth,
thus overlooking the possibility that channels work in opposite directions, offsetting each other.
The novelty of our empirical analysis is to explicitly consider two channels through which
tax decentralisation can affect per capita output growth: the growth of labour productivity and
the employment growth rate. Our empirical strategy consists in estimating the effects of tax
decentralisation separately on both channels, so that the estimated coefficients provide an ap-
proximation for the overall effect on output per capita growth. The analysis is conducted on
a panel of 20 OECD countries over the period 1980-2010, which allows to identify the effects
of tax decentralisation on economic growth, controlling for country specific and time specific
effects to reduce the risk of omitted variables. In order to account for the possibility that output
growth determines labour productivity and the employment rate — for instance, larger growth
may require more workers so it tends to increase the employment rate — a Two-Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) estimator is used with two sets of instruments: the lagged values of tax decent-
ralisation indicators, as it is common in the literature, and a novel set, based on geographical
contiguity and institutional similarities (Ligthart and van Oudheusden, 2017).
The results of the empirical analysis show that the effects of tax decentralisation on output
growth depend on the estimation methodology and the type of instruments used: the effect is pos-
1For an insightful survey on the effects of fiscal decentralisation on economic growth see Baskaran et al. (2014).
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itive with the OLS estimator; its magnitude is reduced when tax decentralisation is instrumented
with its own lagged values; and disappears when instruments bases on institutional similarities
and geographical distance across countries are used. This ambiguous results depend on which
channel prevails, as the two channels react in opposite way to tax decentralisation: the growth
of the employment rate is enhanced, while labour productivity growth is reduced. The effects
on the channels are quite robust to different estimation methodology, set of instruments and the
use of alternative indicators of tax decentralisation that consider the degree of tax autonomy of
subnational governments. Moreover, they remain robust even when the cyclical component has
been removed from the indicators of tax decentralisation by using Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
method.
Overall, the analysis shows that tax decentralisation has an opposite effect on the two chan-
nels, so that the ultimate effect on output growth depends on which one prevails. In particular,
tax decentralisation tends to boost employment growth. This is consistent with the view that
local government responsible to finance their budget have a strong incentive to enlarge their tax
base implementing policies that can better address local labour market issues. Moreover, there
are evidence that tax decentralisation may also support labour-intensive sectors, such as public
administration (Martinez-Va´zquez and Yao, 2009; Adam et al., 2014), stimulating job creation at
the expense of productivity. The positive and significant effect on the growth rate of employment
is however offset by the reduction in the labour productivity growth, resulting in the absence of
any statistically significant effect on output growth. The effects on labour productivity are con-
sistent with the idea that infrastructure and innovation policies require scale economies that are
difficult to achieve at the local level (Stegarescu et al., 2002). Our analysis provides evidence
that focusing on the channels allows to reconcile the results of the existing empirical studies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an extensive survey of the
empirical evidence highlighting the sensitivity of different approaches and the need to look for
the channels. Section 3 discusses the properties of the indicator we use to capture tax decentral-
isation. Section 4 provides a detailed description of the empirical strategy including a discussion
of the econometric model and the control variables. Section 5 presents the results of the panel
regression analysis, providing economic explanations and discussing some of the implications.
Finally, section 6 concludes providing final remarks.
2 Empirical evidence on OECD countries
The empirical literature on fiscal decentralisation and its impact on output growth has signific-
antly expanded since the late 1990s, when the first studies appeared, although it has not reached
yet a consensus. Table 1 provides a detailed overview on the existing empirical evidence on
OECD countries, displaying sample size, decentralisation measures, methodology and main
findings.
One of the possible sources of diverging results is the definition and measured of fiscal de-
centralisation. As shown in Table 1, most of the studies are based on Government Finance
Statistics (GFS) of International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicators. The advantage of using ac-
counting indicators rests in their wider country and time coverage. Yet, some authors criti-
cised the use of GFS-style decentralisation measures (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003; Rodden, 2004;
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Stegarescu, 2005), because they fail to reliably inform about the “true scope for autonomous
decision making on the lower levels of government” (Feld and Schnellenbach, 2011, p. 238),
overestimating the actual degree of fiscal decentralisation. On the expenditure side, the tra-
ditional GFS-style measures include both self-financed spending of subnational governments
and mandatory spending by central government at local level that might indicate an incorrect
higher level of expenditure decentralisation. On the side of revenue, they do not distinguish
between piggybacked taxes, shared taxes and own taxes of subnational governments, causing
overestimation of the GFS measures of (tax) revenue decentralisation. In order to address this
issue, Stegarescu (2005) provides a series of new indicators based on own-source revenue of
local governments, following the methodology proposed by OECD (1999). These indicators are
qualitatively better than the GFS ones because they account for the varying degrees of subna-
tional government fiscal autonomy. Nevertheless, Bodman (2011) recognizes that they could
overstate the degree of effective decentralisation because budget data are aggregated across all
levels of government, without taking into account differences in the degrees of competences
among them. The main shortcomings of Stegarescu’s indicators is however the limited country
(only 23 OECD countries) and time coverage (up to year 2001).
Empirical studies that use GFS indicators find none (Davoodi and Zou, 1998) or negative
(Martı´nez-Va´zquez and McNab, 2003; Rodrı´guez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011) effect of fiscal de-
centralisation on economic growth. In particular, Davoodi and Zou (1998) conclude that the
absence of an effect in developed countries is due to the fact that they “are simply too ho-
mogeneous vis-a-vis developing countries, leaving hardly any cross-country variation in fiscal
decentralization to be linked systematically to cross-country differences in growth” (p. 254).
Ebel and Yilmaz (2003) replicate the work of Davoodi and Zou (1998) with indicators of rev-
enue autonomy finding a positive and significant correlation between the degree of subnational
revenue autonomy and long-run economic growth. They argue that the insignificant effect of
decentralisation found by Davoodi and Zou (1998) is due to erroneous measurement of decent-
ralisation through the GFS-style indicators. The use of alternative indicators that better account
for the degree of subnational government fiscal autonomy does not seem to lead to a convergence
of results, as several empirical studies show a negative relationship using Stegarescu’s indicators
(Bodman, 2011; Baskaran and Feld, 2013; Filippetti and Sacchi, 2016).2
One possible explanation is that the empirical methodology matters for the results. In re-
cent studies, the estimates become more precise with new and more sophisticated economet-
ric methods. A growing number of empirical studies have implemented panel data techniques
to investigate the link between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth. The role played
by methodology in driving estimation results emerges clearly by comparing empirical analyses
conducted by Thornton (2007) and Baskaran and Feld (2013). Both analyses use indicators of
decentralisation based on fiscal autonomy but different econometric approaches for running re-
gressions. By performing cross-sectional analysis, Thornton (2007) does not find any significant
effect of subnational revenue autonomy on economic growth. The panel data analysis conduc-
ted by Baskaran and Feld (2013) shows that decentralisation impacts significantly on economic
2Filippetti and Sacchi (2016) also show that the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth
is conditional on the institutional setting, revealing that fiscal decentralisation is growth enhancing in countries where
local governments have strong political and administrative authority.
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growth only when it is measured through own-source revenue of subnational governments. An-
other example that highlights the importance of methodology is Feld (2005) who finds that the
significant negative effect of fiscal decentralisation on economic growth in pooled regressions,
disappears when fixed-effects are included in the regressions. Asatryan and Feld (2015) focus
on developed countries using a Bayesian model averaging approach, and find that the negative
evidence is not robust to the inclusion fixed-effects.
Most of the empirical studies do not account for the potential reverse causality between de-
centralisation and economic growth. Most of the works that explicitly deal with reverse causality
use the lagged values of fiscal decentralisation as instruments (Martı´nez-Va´zquez and McNab,
2003; Gemmell et al., 2013; Baskaran and Feld, 2013; Filippetti and Sacchi, 2016). This ap-
proach produces a loss of observations that increases the number of missing values in unbalanced
panel data, reducing the precision of estimations. Few studies make use of external instruments
to check for more robust results. Baskaran and Feld (2013) use the qualitative indicator of sub-
national fiscal autonomy realised by Hooghe et al. (2010). This instrument could be exogenous
because it is not affected by annual fluctuations in growth rates and, at the same time, it affects
the degree of subnational government taxation. More recently, Ligthart and van Oudheusden
(2017) propose a set of novel external instrumental variables based on countries similarities
and geographical distance, behind the conjecture that countries that share similar characteristics
show the same pattern of fiscal decentralisation. The IV estimations tend to confirm the results
obtained with the alternative approaches (mainly OLS). In Martı´nez-Va´zquez and McNab (2006)
the Within IV estimator provides more significant estimates than the other estimators when the
sample is limited to developed countries, while in Baskaran and Feld (2013) the results are not
fully robust when controlling for endogeneity.
Finally, existing studies investigate the direct effect of tax decentralisation on output growth
without considering the possible channels through which the effect unfolds. The theoretical
literature has identified different plausible channels through which tax decentralisation affects
economic growth without, however, coming to a definitive conclusion whether decentralisation
is beneficial or harmful for economic growth. The possibility that the effect of decentralisa-
tion on one channel offsets the effect on other channels might be a further explanation of the
heterogeneity in empirical results.
[Table 1]
3 Indicators of tax decentralisation
Three indicators of tax decentralisation are used in our empirical analysis conducted on an un-
balanced panel of 20 high-income OECD countries3 over the period 1980-2010. The first one
is the share of tax revenue of subnational governments (i.e., state and local) over total (consol-
idated) tax revenue. It represents an accounting measure of decentralisation, as it is based on
figures reported in the budget of local administrations. This indicator is obtained from the OECD
3Our sample includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States.
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Fiscal Decentralisation database, and is referred to as Taxdec. It provides a good representation
of tax decentralisation by quantifying the degree of decentralisation using accounting values,
thus it allows to conduct cross-country analysis. A drawback of this accounting indicator is the
absence of information about the actual power of subnational governments to influence their tax
policy, thus overestimating the effect of decentralisation as there is no discrimination between
subnational own taxes and piggybacked or shared taxes (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003; Stegarescu,
2004, 2005).
The second indicator is provided by Stegarescu (2004, 2005), which includes only subn-
ational taxes whose rate, base or both are autonomously defined by local governments. It is,
therefore, based on accounting values but weighted according to the actual possibility of the
local government to influence them. This indicator is referred to as tax autonomy, Taxaut. It is
computed as the share of subnational government own tax revenue on general government total
tax revenue. The problem with this indicator is its time coverage, extended up to year 2001.
These two indicators present few missing observations: just 1 missing value for Taxdec4
and 11 missing values for Taxaut. Table 2 displays the average values of each indicator for
the relevant period. The indicator Taxdec tends to underestimate the degree of tax revenue
decentralisation for countries such as Germany, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The difference
between Taxdec and Taxaut is more than ten percentage points and becomes more severe for
Germany. A similar outcome is observed when the average Taxdec is calculated over the shorter
period 1980-2001. Thus, the main difference between the two indicators can be imputed to their
different budget determinants.
[Table 2]
Since both indicators overstate the degree of effective decentralisation because they aggreg-
ate budget data over all levels of local government, we use an additional indicator of tax decent-
ralisation. We call it as Taxaut-regio. This indicator, constructed by Hooghe et al. (2016), meas-
ures the ability of regional governments to set independently rates and/or bases of taxes. Higher
levels of this indicator implies higher degree of regional government tax autonomy. An advant-
age in using this qualitative indicator is that it is defined upon constitutional rules. Therefore,
its variations reflect an effective change in the degree of subnational government tax autonomy.
Instead, it is more difficult to identify the source of variation in the two budget-based measures
of tax decentralisation because their changes can be simultaneously caused by business fluc-
tuations and fiscal federalism reforms. A drawback in using qualitative indicators is that they
change rarely over time, revealing a low within variance that could be not sufficient to estimate
efficiently their coefficients in models with fixed-effects.
4 Empirical strategy
It has been widely recognized that the output per capita can be expressed as the interaction
between two factors, the labour productivity and the employment rate. Equation (1) shows the
factor decomposition,
4The missing value refers to Italy in 1986, and it is dealt by interpolation using the simple average of the indicator
between 1985 and 1987.
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(
GDP
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)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
output per capita
=
(
GDP
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)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
labour productivity
×
(
emp
pop
)
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employment rate
(1)
where GDP represents gross domestic product expressed in purchasing power parity and con-
stant US Dollars; emp and pop are the employment level and the population in each country,
respectively. The output per capita depends on the number of people employed and their level
of productivity. For any level of productivity an increase in the amount of workers over the
population would increase output per capita; and given the employment rate, if those workers
become more productive it would boost output per capita.
The empirical strategy is based on the linearisation of this factor decomposition, obtained
by considering the annual percentage changes in each component as shown in equation (2).
%∆
GDP
pop
= %∆
GDP
emp
+ %∆
emp
pop
(2)
where %∆ represents the annual percentage change.
The identification of the impact of tax decentralisation on each channel is, therefore, ob-
tained by separately estimating an equation for each term of equation (2).5
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(
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′
i,t + θ z
′
i,t−1 + fi + τt + i,t (3)
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(
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)
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′
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′
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%∆
(
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i,t
= c+ φ2TDi,t + β2x
′
i,t + θ2z
′
i,t−1 + fi + τt + i,t (5)
Each element of equation (2) enters as dependent variable of the empirical specifications
(3)-(5) that include country fixed-effects fi, to control for unobserved characteristics of the i-th
country, and time fixed-effects τt, to control for idiosyncratic shocks spread across countries.6
The right-hand side of each specification includes the same indicator of tax decentralisation
(TD) as well as a 1 × K vector x′i = (x1i , ..., xKi ) of control variables at time t. The vector z
includes controls for the levels of real per-capita GDP (in logarithmic form) and tertiary edu-
cation (Barro, 1991, 1996), both at time t − 1. Since their initial values would be dropped in
the fixed-effect model because they are invariant over time, their lagged values are included. A
constant term c and normally distributed error  with zero mean and constant variance are also
included in the panel regression.
The coefficients attached to the TD indicator in (4) and (5) represent the contribution of
each channel to the overall effect of TD on output per capita growth. Since the relationship is
5This empirical strategy has been developed in the context of urban sprawl by Banzhaf and Lavery (2010).
6In Tables 5 and 6 the results of Hausman (1978) test suggest that the fixed-effects model is correctly specified.
Indeed, it rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between observable variables and unobserved effect at 1%
level.
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linearised the sum of the two coefficients φ1 and φ2 is almost equal to the estimated coefficient
φ. The difference is given by the size of (φ1 · φ2), “which can be expected to be small”(Banzhaf
and Lavery, 2010, p. 172). This allows to identify the direction of the effects produced by tax
decentralisation on each component of economic growth.
Output per hours worked is used as an alternative indicator of labour productivity. The
advantage of using hours worked instead of employment is to correct for the downward bias
introduced by part-time workers in the original indicator. The econometric model is modified
according to the following factor decomposition of per capita output growth, where the number
of workers (employment) is substituted by hours worked as illustrated in equation (6).
∆%
GDP
pop
= ∆%
GDP
hours
+ ∆%
hours
pop
(6)
4.1 Estimation methodology
The baseline model is estimated using the OLS estimator with heteroskedastic and autocorrel-
ated consistent (HAC) standard errors.7 However, the estimation based on the OLS methodology
may suffer from reverse causality because tax decentralisation maybe driven by output growth
(Martı´nez-Va´zquez et al., 2016). An instrumental variables approach is adopted to overcome this
problem. The validity of this approach depends on the quality of the instruments, that should be
correlated to the tax decentralisation indicators and uncorrelated to the dependent variable, as
well as being orthogonal to the error term.
It is difficult to find instruments for fiscal decentralisation that satisfy all conditions sim-
ultaneously.8 For this reason, most empirical studies have addressed endogeneity by using the
lagged values of fiscal decentralisation indicators as instruments (Gemmell et al., 2013; Filip-
petti and Sacchi, 2016). However, the use of the lagged values causes loss of observations and
information, making point of estimates less precise. Ligthart and van Oudheusden (2017) pro-
pose a set of novel instrumental variables. Those instruments are based on the conjecture that
countries with similar institutional features, such as the political system, the legal system, size
or geographical location should display similar fiscal decentralisation patterns. Building on this
approach, we define two external instruments and use them in the 2SLS panel data regression
analysis.9 The first instrument Z1i consists of the weighted average of fiscal decentralisation of
countries with a similar institutional setting as country i. The concept of similarity is based on
the presence of autonomous regions as defined in the Database of Political Institutions (Thorsten
et al., 2001), according to which a region, area, or district is autonomous or self-governing.10
7Regarding the presence of heteroskedasticity, see the results of the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test displayed in
Tables 5 and 6. The Bartlett-kernel approach is used to solve autocorrelation detected with the Arellano and Bond
(1991) test. The bandwidth is selected according to the order of serial correlation detected in the errors. See the test
results in Tables 5 and 6.
8See Martı´nez-Va´zquez et al. (2016) for a comprehensive discussion.
9Since TD has missing values, the number of countries changes over time when the instruments are calculated.
This drawback is addressed by the substitution of missing values with interpolated data (Ligthart and van Oud-
heusden, 2017).
10Furthermore, they must be constitutionally designated as autonomous or independent or special. Federal Districts
or Capital Districts do not count as autonomous regions. Disputed autonomy is not recorded. Indian reservations are
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The instrument is described in equation (7).
Z1it =
N∑
j=1
qij · TDjt qij =

γij∑N
j=1 γij
for i 6= j
0 for i = j
(7)
Tax decentralisation TD of the j -th country at time t is weighted by q that depends on sim-
ilarity (γ) between countries i and j. The dummy γ assumes value 1 when the two countries are
similar, and zero otherwise. The similarity depends on the presence, or absence, of autonomous
regions. Therefore, the weight qij is zero if country i and j are not similar (for instance, i has
autonomous regions while j does not), while it assumes value one for all regions similar to i,
i.e., they are all with autonomous regions or without.
The second instrument is based on the idea that geographical proximity should explain sim-
ilar patterns of fiscal decentralisation as neighbouring countries tend to mutually mimic each
others’ fiscal policies (Ligthart and van Oudheusden, 2017). This idea is at the base of the
application of spatial econometric models to the analysis of fiscal interactions between jurisdic-
tions (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). Accordingly, the instrument for country i consists of
the sum of fiscal decentralisation across countries weighted for their geographical proximity to
country i:
Z2it =
N∑
j=1
wij · TDjt wij =

ωij∑N
j=1 ωij
for i 6= j
0 for i = j
(8)
where ω assumes value 1 if the geographical distance between the capital cities of countries i
and j is less than 1,000 kilometres, and 0 if the distance is above this threshold.11
Table 3 shows the pairwise correlation between fiscal decentralisation and the instruments. A
positive (negative) correlation between the instruments and the indicators of tax decentralisation
suggests a certain degree of complementarity (substitution) in fiscal decentralisation decisions
of countries that are geographically close or share common features. The pairwise correlation
reveals that the instrument Z1 (Z2) is negatively (positively) correlated with each indicator of
tax decentralisation at the significant level of 1%. According to this result the 2SLS estimates,
obtained using these instruments, should not suffer from efficiency loss compared to the OLS
estimates.
[Table 3]
4.2 Control variables
A set of control variables is included to account for factors that affect output growth independ-
ently of fiscal decentralisation. Since “growth theory is not explicit about what variables belong
not counted as autonomous.
11The distance between the capital cities of countries is collected from CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011)
available at: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
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in the “true” regression” (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004, p.813), the choice is based on previous em-
pirical works and tend to reflect the most important determinants in advanced economies (e.g.,
Levine and Renelt, 1992; Barro, 1996; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004).
We include three groups of control variables: socio-demographic, macroeconomic and in-
stitutional. The group of socio-demographic variables consists of: total population growth (Pop.
growth); the Fertility rate, measured as total births per woman; and the number of tertiary year
schooling (Schooling). For a given starting level of real per-capita GDP, two opposing effects
impact its growth rate: on the one hand, there is a negative effect caused by higher population
growth and fertility rates which dilute the capital of the economy since a portion of the invest-
ment is used to provide capital for new workers, rather than to raise capital per worker (Barro,
1996); on the other hand, there is a positive effect caused by higher initial levels of education
which raises the economy’s ability to absorb new technologies, the capability of doing research
and development (R&D), and, more generally, to concentrate on high value-added sectors.
The group of macroeconomic indicators includes investment as share of GDP, government
consumption, trade openness, inflation rate, and the first order lagged value of the level of per
capita GDP. We use the investment share of GDP (Investment ratio) as a proxy for growth of
physical capital. It is generally accepted that the investment ratio positively affects economic
growth and a number of empirical studies confirm this (e.g., Long and Summers, 1991; Mankiw
et al., 1992; Levine and Renelt, 1992).
The economic literature that has investigated the impact of the size of government on eco-
nomic growth seems to have reached a consensus on the fact that there is a negative correlation
between the two variables (in OECD countries) and this result holds independently of the way
government size is measured (Bergh and Henrekson, 2011).12 Since it does not make sense to
measure the impact of an aggregate such as the government size on growth (Bergh and Henrek-
son, 2011), we try to capture the effect of government consumption only (Barro, 1991, 1996).
Hence, we proxy the size of the government by government consumption as a share of PPP
converted GDP per-capita (Gov. Consump.).
Trade openness, measured as the sum of exports and imports on GDP, captures the effect of
international trade on output growth, including the possibility to import and adopt new technolo-
gies. On the one side, the theoretical literature has not offered a justification for the proposition
that trade openness unambiguously leads to higher long-run economic growth (Eris. and Ulas.an,
2013, p. 869). On the other side, the empirical evidence has been inconclusive. Several stud-
ies find a significant positive correlation between trade openness and economic growth (Barro,
1996; Karras, 2003; Chang et al., 2009). Eris. and Ulas.an (2013), utilising Bayesian model av-
eraging techniques, find no evidence that trade openness is directly and robustly correlated with
economic growth in the long run period. Hence, the debate on the impact of trade openness on
output growth is still an open issue, especially when considering samples of developed countries.
The inflation rate, measured by the consumer price index, represents an indicator of mac-
roeconomic stability. The growth literature13 has shown an inverse relation between the growth
rates of GDP and prices. This indicator also helps to control for the effect of the business cycle
on our estimation results.
12Bergh and Henrekson (2011) offers one of the most comprehensive critical survey articles on this subject.
13For a thorough discussion see, among others, the work of Barro (1995, 1996).
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The level of per-capita GDP is included in logarithmic form and lagged of one year to reflect
the endowments of physical capital, natural resources and the level of technology which is un-
observed, as well as to account for economic convergence. Moreover, the lagged value is used
because the level of GDP per capita at the beginning of the period cannot be included because
of multicollinearity issues with the country fixed effects.
Finally, two constitutional controls are included in the model. The first one concerns the
federal form of government (Federal gov.). The effect of fiscal decentralisation may be different
in these two types of countries because of the different administrative relationship across levels
of government — i.e., more autonomous in federal countries. The constitutional control is a
dummy that assumes value 1 if country is federal, and zero otherwise.14 The second indicator
reflects the membership to the European Union (EU) and consists in a dummy variable that takes
value 1 for member states (since year of accession) and zero, otherwise. We expect a positive
sign of this variable on output growth because the EU countries share a common market that
fosters trade exchanges among them, turning out into higher growth rates in employment and
GDP in the EU zone.
Descriptive statistics on the controls and the dependent variables are displayed on Table 4.
[Table 4]
5 Estimation results
The results of the baseline model estimated with the OLS estimator and standard errors corrected
for heterogeneity and autocorrelation are illustrated in Tables 5 and 6. They show that tax
decentralisation has a positive and statistically significant impact on output per capita growth; 10
percentage point increase in Taxdec results in an increase of 0.6 percentage points of the annual
growth rate of GDP per capita. This positive impact stems from boosting the employment rate,
as the growth of labour productivity is not statistically different from zero (see columns 3 and
5 of Table 5). These results are also confirmed by the use of Taxaut-regio as indicator of tax
decentralisation (Table 6). Stegarescu’s indicator of subnational tax revenue autonomy does not
show any significant effect on per capita output growth and its main components.
[Table 5]
[Table 6]
The OLS results could be biased because of reverse causality. Increasing output growth may
lead to more tax revenue decentralisation, as richer constituencies would pressure for more ad-
ministrative powers. We control for reverse causality instrumenting the two budget measures of
tax decentralisation with their own lagged values, as standard in the literature.15 The assumption
is that past decentralisation trends should explain current levels of growth and not vice versa. In
14Information on federalism are extracted from the Comparative Political database realised by Armingeon et al.
(2015).
15The indicator Taxaut-regio is assumed to be exogenous because it is determined by changes in constitutional
rules rather than output fluctuations (Baskaran and Feld, 2013).
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particular, the third and fourth lagged value of the dependent variable are used as instruments in
the 2SLS panel regression (Gemmell et al., 2013). They can be valid instruments as long as they
are uncorrelated to the error term. They satisfy this condition with few exceptions (see column
1 and 2 of Table 5), as the Arellano and Bond (1991) test results displayed in Table 5 show that
the error term in the most of the panel regressions is autocorrelated of an order greater than 1.
Additionally, the instruments should be correlated with the endogenous variable. This condition
is tested with the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, robust to both
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation, while the strength of the correlation – necessary to em-
pirically identify the parameters of interest – is tested by the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F -statistic
(Kleibergen and Paap, 2006; Baum et al., 2007). Overall, the validity of the set of instruments is
checked using the Hansen (1982)’s J test of over-identification robust to heteroskedastic errors.
The 2SLS estimates reported in column 1 of Table 7 confirm a growth-enhancing effect
of tax decentralisation measured by Taxdec. Output growth is driven by rising employment
growth rate with no significant effect of labour productivity (see columns 3 and 5). The positive
and significant estimated coefficient of the employment growth rate should be considered with
caution because the Hansen (1982) J statistic rejects the null-hypothesis at the 10% level of
significance, suggesting that the instruments is weak for such regression.
Contrary to the OLS estimation, the results of the instrumental variable approach using the
degree of subnational government tax autonomy as indicator of tax decentralisation become
statistically significant. Columns 2 and 6 of Table 7 show that an increase in Taxaut of 10
percentage point boosts growth of both output per capita and employment rate by 1.4 and 1.9
percentage points, respectively. Although both results should be taken cautiously because the
Hansen’s J test rejects the null, the coefficient magnitude of Taxaut is larger than for Taxdec.
This result shows the importance of the delegation of administrative powers, not only of the
relative budget. A positive effect of Taxaut on the growth of the working hours per capita is
observed on column 10 of Table 7. In this case, the Kleibergen-Paap tests and the Hansen-J -test
revail that the set of instruments are strong and valid overall.
[Table 7]
The instrumental variables approach is important for the correct identification of the effect
of tax decentralisation on growth and on the channels. However, it depends on the explanat-
ory power of the instruments used. For this reason Table 8 reports the estimation results of
the empirical specifications with alternative instruments, based on geographical proximity and
institutional similarities. It shows that the effect of tax decentralisation on output growth be-
comes insignificant as the negative effect on labour productivity offsets the positive effect on
the employment rate. Indeed, the results confirm that the effect on output growth depend on the
balance between these two channels. The use of different instruments does not affect the positive
and significant impact of tax decentralisation on the employment rate, while it strengthens the
impact on labour productivity. In detail, increasing Taxdec by 10 percentage points reduces la-
bour productivity growth by 1.2 percentage points (see column 3) and increases the employment
growth rate by 1.1 percentage points (see column 5), thus resulting in no effect on per capita
output growth. Furthermore, these results are highly statistically significant (1% level). The
impact of Taxdec on the two channels of economic growth is confirmed also when productivity
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is measured in terms of GDP per hours worked and employment is proxied by working hours
per capita. These results are robust to the use of Taxaut. Columns 6 and 10 of Table 8 show that
an increase in Taxaut of 10 percentage point boosts growth rate of employment (and working
hours per-capita) by about 1.9 percentage points. Column 8 shows that a 10 percentage point
increase in Taxaut reduces the growth of labour productivity by 1.3 percentage points.
The new set of instruments perform better than the instruments based on the lagged values
of tax decentralisation. Table 8 shows that the Kleibergen-Paap (KP) rk Wald F -statistic is larger
than 10, suggesting that the new set of instruments is strong according to the “thumb rule” of
Staiger and Stock (1997). Moreover, the Hansen-J -test accepts always the null, confirming again
their validity in the panel regression analyses.
[Table 8]
The negative impact of tax decentralisation on labour productivity seems to contradict the
established view that sees fiscal decentralisation as a way to improve the efficiency in the pro-
duction and supply of public goods and services at local level (Martı´nez-Va´zquez and McNab,
2003), and trigger a healthy competition among jurisdictions that can lead to an efficient use of
public resources (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). However, if competition does not work be-
cause of scarce mobility of the tax base, inefficiencies in the public goods production remain,
undermining productivity gains and economic growth.
Furthermore, infrastructures and R&D that are essential to stimulate productivity, require an
efficient scale of production which is usually larger than local jurisdictions. The delegation of
taxing powers, thus fiscal resources, to subnational government can thus reduce the resources
available at the central level to implement such policies. Such public goods produce externalities
across jurisdictions that could benefit from a policy coordination of a central institution when
coordination among local governments is absent or inefficient. In this context, centralisation of
policy coordination could improve the efficiency in public goods provision with an increase in
the rates of productivity and output growth (Stegarescu et al., 2002).
The increase in the employment growth rate is consistent with the increased competition
at the subnational level that creates job opportunities, for instance, by activating idle local re-
sources. The same competition, however, may result in concentration of productive firms/economic
activities in few “winning” regions which is not enough to compensate for the lost productivity
in “losing” regions. Furthermore, tax decentralisation means that the regional budget depends
on local economic activities, so local governments are keen in retaining firms and employment,
even though these activities are not very productive. For instance, if the devolution of taxing
powers stimulate the creation of new employment opportunities in low productive and more
labour-intensive sectors, such as the public administration and agriculture, it would decrease
labour productivity and increase employment (Martinez-Va´zquez and Yao, 2009; Adam et al.,
2014).
The estimated coefficients of the control variables present the expected signs, confirming
theoretical predictions (Barro, 1991, 1996). The estimation provides evidence of economic con-
vergence. Richer countries (i.e., higher initial level of GDP per capita) tend to grow less than
poorer countries. The analysis shows that this effect passes through labour productivity, while
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the employment growth rate is not statistically affected by the level of output per capita. In-
vestment as share of GDP tends to increase output growth via the employment rate. It is also
confirmed when working hours per-capita is used instead of employment. It does not have any
direct effect on labour productivity. The degree of trade openness boosts output growth mainly
through labour productivity, reinforcing the idea that trade openness works mainly through tech-
nology diffusion but does not necessarily generate new jobs. A high inflation rate introduces
uncertainty in the economy that reduces the employment growth and increases labour productiv-
ity growth, resulting in a lower output growth. Also the size of government consumption hinders
output growth through the reduction of the employment rate growth.
Focusing on the socio-demographic controls, higher fertility rates significantly reduce per
capita output growth through a reduction in the growth of the employment rate (Becker and
Barro, 1988). Instead, population growth does not affect economic growth nor its factor com-
ponents. Only in few regressions, education attainment of the labour force appears to be posit-
ively and significantly correlated with output per capita growth, without any clear-cut indication
on the transmission channels.
We find that federal countries have lower output growth rates than unitary countries, due to
lower growth rates in employment. The European Union membership leads to a better output
growth performance due to higher growth rates in employment that more than compensate for
lower growth rates in labour productivity.
5.1 Robustness
Since changes in fiscal decentralisation may reflect business cycle fluctuations rather than changes
in competencies, we use the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter to separate the cyclical compon-
ent from the trend in the two budget-based measures of tax decentralisation. The trends of the tax
decentralisation indicators enter in the 2SLS regressions with the names Taxdec-hp and Taxaut-
hp.16 We perform the 2SLS panel regressions with also the trend component of the instrumental
variables based on institutional similarities and geographical distance. The analysis confirms
previous results (Table 9). The negative effect of Taxdec-hp on the labour productivity growth
are off-set by those on the employment, without any significant change in the output growth.
High degrees of sub-national tax autonomy measured by Taxaut-hp leads to an increase in the
growth rate of employment, causing a significant growth-enhancing.
The inclusion of some countries may drive the results. For instance, Luxembourg and Bel-
gium can be outliners because of the small population size and decentralisation trends, respect-
ively. Luxembourg is excluded because it has a very small population (Thiessen, 2003). Belgium
is removed because it embraced federalism in the early of 1990s, showing a more closed pattern
of decentralisation to those of the rest of advanced economies only at the end of the 2000s. By
performing all IV regressions without Luxembourg and Belgium, the results still hold. The main
difference with the previous estimates is the coefficients of Taxdec on column 1 of Tables 7 and
on column 9 of Table 8 that loses statistical significance.
[Table 9]
16The missing values of Taxaut-hp have been interpolated in order to perform the Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
filter.
14
6 Conclusion
Tax decentralisation affects output growth through labour productivity and employment. The
empirical analysis conducted on a panel of 20 OECD countries reveals that tax decentralisation
increases the growth of the employment rate and through this channel affects output growth.
The impact on labour productivity however is mixed, in some specifications the impact is not
significant while in others it is negative. Therefore the impact on output growth is mainly due to
the growth of people employed.
The impact on these two channels is quite robust to different specifications of the model,
however the ultimate impact on output growth depends on the methodology and the set of in-
struments used in the panel regression analysis. For instance, tax decentralisation has a positive
effect on growth when the lags of fiscal decentralisation indicators are used as instruments, but
looses any significant effect when a new set of instruments based on countries similarities and
geographic distance is used. In particular, the estimates with the new set of instruments show the
presence of a counterbalanced effect of tax decentralisation on the labour productivity growth
and the employment growth which turn out into an insignificant effect on economic growth.
The empirical analysis provides a possible way to reconcile some of the heterogeneous res-
ults in the empirical literature, which struggles with the identification of the overall effect be-
cause of the balancing role played by the two channels. In terms of policy, it provides robust
evidence that tax decentralisation boost job creation, but it should be complemented with other
policies to increase labour productivity.
Further research into the effect of tax decentralisation on employment and especially pro-
ductivity is needed to better understand the relationship between decentralisation and growth.
15
Table 1: Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in OECD countries: Empirical evidence
Author (year) Sample Period FD variable FD data source Methods Aut., Non-
linear
Main effect
Davoodi and Zou
(1998)
46 developed and
developing coun-
tries
1970-1989 SNG share of total gov. exp. (net of intergovernmental transfers) GFS P None for developed countries
Castles (1999) 21 OECD 1960-1992 SNG share of states and local taxes in total revenue OECD C Positive
Ebel and Ylmaz (2002) 19 OECD 1997-1999 Sub-national tax autonomy; Subnational non-tax autonomy; Subna-
tional fiscal dependency ( i.e., the ratios of intergovernmental trans-
fers to total subnational revenue); Subnational tax sharing
OECD C A SNG (non-)tax autonomy: positive; SNG tax
sharing: negative
Thiessen (2003) 21 high-income
countires
1973-1998 SNG expenditures (revenues) in consolidated gov. expenditures (rev-
enues); unweighted average of the two indicators ; hump-shaped in-
dicators
GFS P/C NL Inverted U-shaped relationship
Eller (2004) 22 OECD 1972-1996 Share of sub-national government expenditures in general govern-
ment expenditures net of intergovernmental transfers; Ratio of sub-
national government revenues to total government revenues; hump-
shaped indicators of decentralization.
GFS P/C NL Revenue decentralisation: none; Medium (low)
level of expenditure decentralisation: positive
(negative)
Feld (2005) 19 OECD 1973-1998 Share of State and local gov. expenditure from total gov. expenditure
(%); share of State and local gov. revenue from total revenue of which
State and local gov. autonomously decide on tax rates or tax bases
(%); share of State and local gov. revenue from total revenue of which
State and local gov. autonomously decide on tax rates or tax bases or
obtain from joint taxation system (%)
Stegarescu (2005) P A Negative in pooled regressions; none or positive
in fixed-effects regressions
Martinez-Vazquez and
McNab (2006)
64 developed and
developing coun-
tries
1972-2003 SNG share of total gov. expenditure/revenue GFS P, IV Negative in regressions with developed coun-
tries
Thornton (2007) 19 OECD 1980-2000 SNG own tax revenue OECD (1999) C A, NL None
Bodman (2011) 18 OECD 1975-2008,
1981-1998
SNG share of general government expenditure/revenue; Stegarescu’s
indicators; additional indicators
GFS, Stegarescu
(2005)
C/P A, NL None in regressions with standard decentralisa-
tion measures; no hump-shaped relationship
Buser (2011) 20 OECD 1972-2005 Share of SNG revenue net of grants; Share of SNG expenditure net
of grants ; Average of SNG revenue and expenditure shares; Share of
SNG own source revenue
GFS P A, NL Positive but decreasing with higher levels of de-
centralisation; Subnational revenue autonomy:
positive
Rodrguez-Pose and Ez-
curra (2011)
21 OECD 1990-2005 SNG share of total gov. revenue/expenditure; SNG share in total gov.
current (capital, economic affairs, health, education, social protec-
tion) expenditure
GFS P NL Negative; inverted U-shaped in regressions with
current expenditure decentralisation
Baskaran and Feld
(2013)
23 OECD 1975-2008 SNG tax revenues as share of total gov. tax revenues; Stegarescu’s
indicator of tax revenue autonomy and its extension with OECD data;
SNG expenditures as share of total gov. expenditures
GFS, OECD,
Stegarescu (2005)
P, IV A, NL Negative; not hump-shaped relationship
Blochliger and Egert
(2013)
All OECD 1970-2011 SNG share of GG tot. expenditures (or revenue, tax revenues); SNG
tax autonomy
OECD P A, NL Positive effect that decreases with higher levels
of decentralisation
Gemmell, Kneller and
Sanz (2013)
23 OECD 1972-2005 SNG expenditure minus transfers from subnational to central gov.
on CGG expenditures; SNG expenditure minus grants from other
governments to CGG expenditures; SNG revenue minus grants from
other governments on CGG revenue; indicator of SNG own tax rev-
enue; indicator of SNG autonomous and shared own revenue
OECD P, IV A Expenditure decentralisation: negative; Rev-
enue decentralisation: positive
Asatryan and Feld
(2015)
23 OECD 1975-2000 Stegarescu’s (2005) indicators of tax revenue autonomy; ratio of
subnational-to-total gov. expenditure /revenue/tax revenue
OECD, Stegarescu
(2005)
P A, NL No robust negative relationship
Filippetti and Sacchi
(2016)
21 OECD 1970-2010 SNG share of own tax revenue on GG total tax revenues; SNG share
of property (or income) taxes on GG total tax revenues; SNG share
of public expenditure on GG total public expenditure; Regional au-
thority index
GFS, Marks et al.,
2008, Stegarescu
(2005)
P, IV A Negative or positive impact dependent on insti-
tutional setting
Ligthart and van Oud-
heusden (2017)
56 developed and
developing coun-
tries
1990-2007 SNG share of GG tot. expenditure & revenue; SNG autonomous tax
revenue on total gov. tax revenue
GFS, OECD P, IV A OECD-27: none; OECD-14: positive
Note: A= Local fiscal autonomy, C=Cross-section; GG = General Government; CGG= Consolidated General Government; GFS = Government Finance Statistics (IMF); IV= instrumental variable; NL= Non-linear effect; P=Panel data; SNG=
Sub-national Government; Source: Authors’ compilation.
Table 2: Simple mean of tax revenue de-
centralisation indicators over the period 1980-
2010
Country
Taxdec Taxaut
(1980-2010) (1980-2001)
Australia 19.94 20.47
Austria 13.25 3.50
Belgium 6.84 14.94
Canada 46.24 52.42
Denmark 30.95 30.11
Finland 21.90 26.48
France 9.98 16.74
Germany 29.90 7.36
Greece 1.16 0.25
Ireland 2.35 2.73
Italy 8.35 3.59
Luxembourg 5.74 8.66
Netherlands 2.87 4.29
Norway 17.25 25.10
Portugal 4.94 1.80
Spain 8.36 12.58
Sweden 31.42 42.98
Switzerland 41.47 56.20
United Kingdom 6.47 8.97
United States 33.17 37.16
OECD 17.13 18.82
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from
OECD Fiscal Decentralisation Database and Stegarescu
(2004, 2005).
Table 3: Correlations between endogen-
ous and instrumental variables
Endogenous variables
Taxdec Taxaut
Instruments
Z1 -0.533*** -0.647***
Z2 0.505*** 0.418***
Note: Z1 and Z2 are computed for each indic-
ator of fiscal decentralisation. ***= 1% level.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and data sources for 20 OECD countries
Definition Abbrev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Within-var. Between-var. Min Max Source
Dependent Variables
Growth rate of GDP per capita, % ∆% GDP p.c. 620 1.84 2.40 2.33 0.60 -8.7 10.02 OECD.Stat
Growth rate of GDP per person employed, % ∆% Productivity 620 1.47 1.82 1.75 0.51 -6.45 7.32 OECD.Stat
Growth rate of Employment-to-population ratio, % ∆% Empl-pop 620 0.37 1.73 1.69 0.39 -8.83 7.33 OECD.Stat
Growth rate of GDP per working hours, % ∆% GDP-hours 585 1.86 1.88 1.78 0.62 -6.23 10.48 OECD.Stat
Growth rate of Working hours per capita, % ∆% Hours p.c. 585 0.03 2.02 1.99 0.39 -12.24 5.79 OECD.Stat
Fiscal Decentralization Variables
SCG tax revenue (minus intergovernmental transfer
spending)-to-consolidated total GG revenue, %
Taxdec 620 17.12 13.88 2.87 13.93 0.76 49.22 OECD-FDD
SCG tax revenue (minus intergovernmental transfer
spending)-to-consolidated total GG revenue % filtered
by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) method
Taxdec-hp 620 17.12 13.85 2.72 13.93 0.80 49.16 OECD-FDD
SCG own tax rev.-to-GG total tax rev. % Taxaut 429 18.91 17.07 2.93 17.22 0.05 58.68 Stegarescu (2004, 2005)
SCG own tax rev.-to-GG total tax rev. % filtered by
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) method
Taxaut-hp 440 18.85 17.01 2.78 17.20 0.18 58.82 Stegarescu (2004, 2005)
Regional tax autonomy Taxaut-regio 620 2.07 1.64 0.53 1.59 0 5.1 Hooghe et. al (2016)
Social & Demographic Variables
Population growth, (% annual) Pop. growth 620 0.59 0.48 0.34 0.35 -0.43 2.89 WDI
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) Fertility rate 620 1.66 0.26 0.16 0.21 1.16 3.21 WDI
Tertiary year schooling Schooling 620 0.54 0.27 0.16 0.23 0.08 1.61 BL 2.0
Macroeconomic Variables
Investment Share of PPP Converted GDPpc (2005
const. prices)
Investment ratio 620 23.42 3.87 2.57 2.97 13.71 34.07 PWT 7.1
General government final consumption (% of GDP) Gov. Consump. 620 7.13 1.67 0.98 1.38 3.02 11.3 WDI
Openness at 2005 constant prices, % Trade Openness 620 70.27 50.16 19.88 47.21 11.83 326.54 PWT 7.1
Consumer price index, 2010=100 Inflation rate 620 71.02 20.57 19.50 6.73 5.2 105.7 OECD.Stat
GDP per capita (constant 2005 USD), in natural log-
arithmic
Per-capita GDP 620 10.35 0.38 0.20 0.32 9.26 11.36 WDI
Political & Constitutional Variables
European Union (EU) membership (EU=1; other-
wise=0)
EU membership 620 0.66 0.47 0.23 0.42 0 1 Author’s elaboration
Federal Government (1= federal; otherwise=0) Federal Gov. 620 0.38 0.48 0.11 0.48 0 1 Author’s elaboration on the
Armingeon et al. (2015)
data
Note: WDI = World Bank’s World Development Indicators; PWT7.1 = Penn World Tables Version 7.1; OECD-FDD = OECD’s Fiscal Decentralization Database; BL2.0 = Barro-Lee
Educational Attainment Dataset version 2.0 available at: http://www.barrolee.com/, see Barro and Lee (2013).
Table 5: OLS estimation results
∆% GDP per-capita ∆% GDP per-worker ∆% Employment rate ∆% GDP per-hour worked ∆% Working hours per-capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Taxdec 0.059** -0.002 0.059** 0.001 0.023
(2.17) (-0.09) (2.52) (0.03) (0.65)
Taxaut 0.013 -0.040 0.055 -0.052 0.061
(0.39) (-1.46) (1.63) (-1.59) (1.57)
Pop. growth -0.339 -0.202 -0.205 -0.196 -0.136 -0.019 -0.232 -0.336 -0.120 0.255
(-1.18) (-0.38) (-0.72) (-0.39) (-0.51) (-0.04) (-0.60) (-0.50) (-0.34) (0.41)
Fertility rate -3.843*** -2.856*** -1.062* -0.566 -2.679*** -2.172*** -0.554 -0.153 -2.838*** -2.945***
(-4.76) (-3.46) (-1.67) (-0.71) (-4.15) (-3.03) (-0.62) (-0.14) (-3.62) (-3.44)
Schoolingt−1 0.827 2.914 1.621* 1.237 -0.800 1.594 1.979* 1.537 -0.984 1.562
(0.69) (1.61) (1.65) (0.88) (-0.72) (1.11) (1.75) (1.02) (-0.75) (0.86)
Investment ratio 0.209*** 0.184*** 0.015 0.038 0.191*** 0.144*** -0.019 -0.029 0.220*** 0.180***
(4.13) (2.97) (0.39) (0.78) (4.85) (3.40) (-0.43) (-0.55) (4.73) (3.10)
Gov. consump. -0.428*** -0.384* -0.170 -0.089 -0.251** -0.292** -0.282* -0.132 -0.057 -0.186
(-2.80) (-1.93) (-1.22) (-0.55) (-2.00) (-2.13) (-1.81) (-0.73) (-0.36) (-1.09)
Trade openness 0.025** 0.080*** 0.026** 0.052*** -0.001 0.028** 0.018 0.042** 0.004 0.031**
(1.98) (4.71) (2.23) (3.09) (-0.12) (1.99) (1.48) (2.09) (0.38) (2.05)
Inflation rate -0.050* -0.051* 0.041** 0.037 -0.090*** -0.085*** 0.037 0.019 -0.094*** -0.096***
(-1.90) (-1.90) (2.01) (1.47) (-3.53) (-3.65) (1.36) (0.73) (-2.96) (-3.15)
Per-capita GDPt−1 (log) -8.232*** -8.513*** -8.606*** -9.950*** 0.397 1.428 -7.025*** -7.465*** -1.521 -2.375
(-4.54) (-3.96) (-5.36) (-4.89) (0.24) (0.75) (-3.57) (-3.03) (-0.68) (-0.95)
EU membership 1.087** 1.073** -0.338 -0.454 1.386*** 1.495*** -0.578 -1.105** 1.710*** 2.099***
(2.57) (2.20) (-0.87) (-1.11) (3.54) (3.11) (-1.43) (-2.48) (3.48) (3.48)
Federal gov. -0.408 -1.743*** -0.399 -0.433 -0.015 -1.309*** -0.463 -0.214 0.071 -1.486*
(-0.94) (-3.20) (-1.08) (-0.96) (-0.04) (-2.68) (-0.80) (-0.28) (0.14) (-1.88)
R2 0.233 0.259 0.123 0.138 0.242 0.301 0.064 0.076 0.190 0.236
F -test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000
BP-test 0.045 0.021 0.000 0.980 0.027 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Hausman test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
AR(1) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test 0.000 0.000 0.724 0.932 0.000 0.001 0.892 0.317 0.047 0.225
AR(3) test 0.006 0.095 0.904 0.675 0.394 0.571 0.486 0.873 0.960 0.848
AR(4) test 0.436 0.786 0.874 0.512 0.919 0.913 0.704 0.385 0.287 0.407
Group No. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Obs. No. 600 409 600 409 600 409 570 379 570 379
Note: Standard errors robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. t-statistics in parenthesis. p-value is reported for the tests. Significant at level ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Table 6: OLS estimation results with the regional tax autonomy indicator
∆% GDP per-capita ∆% GDP per-worker ∆% Employment rate ∆% GDP per-hour worked ∆% Working hours per-capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Taxaut-regio -0.011 -0.258 0.245** -0.153 0.159
(-0.08) (-1.56) (2.23) (-0.96) (1.24)
Pop. growth -0.342 -0.130 -0.214 -0.190 -0.162
(-1.16) (-0.45) (-0.79) (-0.48) (-0.45)
Fertility rate -3.751*** -1.163* -2.489*** -0.641 -2.704***
(-4.60) (-1.86) (-3.84) (-0.72) (-3.42)
Schoolingt−1 0.692 1.427 -0.739 1.863 -0.933
(0.57) (1.44) (-0.66) (1.64) (-0.71)
Investment ratio 0.210*** 0.011 0.196*** -0.020 0.222***
(4.24) (0.30) (4.94) (-0.47) (4.75)
Gov. consump. -0.386** -0.147 -0.233* -0.266* -0.060
(-2.57) (-1.06) (-1.90) (-1.73) (-0.38)
Trade openness 0.026** 0.024** 0.002 0.017 0.005
(2.02) (2.12) (0.22) (1.41) (0.49)
Inflation rate -0.045* 0.043** -0.086*** 0.038 -0.094***
(-1.75) (2.10) (-3.47) (1.42) (-2.95)
Per-capita GDPt−1 (log) -8.287*** -8.618*** 0.354 -7.041*** -1.569
(-4.60) (-5.38) (0.21) (-3.58) (-0.69)
EU membership 0.834** -0.362 1.164*** -0.593 1.730***
(2.08) (-1.07) (3.21) (-1.46) (3.52)
Federal gov. -0.252 0.103 -0.362 -0.156 -0.195
(-0.49) (0.22) (-0.82) (-0.25) (-0.35)
R2 0.224 0.129 0.235 0.066 0.192
F -test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
BP-test 0.034 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000
Hausman test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
AR(1) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
AR(2) test 0.000 0.939 0.000 0.529 0.049
AR(3) test 0.021 0.638 0.500 0.827 0.861
AR(4) test 0.813 0.606 0.904 0.894 0.217
Group No. 20 20 20 20 20
Obs. No. 600 600 600 570 570
Note: Standard errors robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. t-statistics in parenthesis. p-value is reported for the tests. Significant at level ***1%,
**5%, *10%.
Table 7: The 2SLS estimation results with lagged instruments
∆% GDP per-capita ∆% GDP per-worker ∆% Employment rate ∆% GDP per-hour worked ∆% Working hours per-capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Taxdec 0.059* -0.028 0.084*** -0.052 0.086
(1.72) (-0.94) (2.73) (-0.87) (1.56)
Taxaut 0.139** -0.056 0.193*** -0.044 0.178**
(2.08) (-1.03) (3.02) (-0.73) (2.34)
Pop. growth -0.231 0.130 -0.179 -0.131 -0.054 0.244 -0.227 -0.277 -0.037 0.493
(-0.77) (0.23) (-0.61) (-0.24) (-0.19) (0.54) (-0.56) (-0.38) (-0.10) (0.77)
Fertility rate -4.496*** -4.045*** -1.348 -0.984 -3.053*** -2.932*** -1.118 -0.906 -2.982*** -2.907***
(-4.08) (-3.57) (-1.62) (-0.97) (-3.62) (-3.17) (-1.04) (-0.68) (-3.12) (-2.72)
Schoolingt−1 0.705 3.550 1.478 0.863 -0.768 2.592 1.687 0.572 -0.926 2.701
(0.53) (1.40) (1.38) (0.46) (-0.62) (1.49) (1.37) (0.30) (-0.64) (1.25)
Investment ratio 0.249*** 0.223** 0.034 0.094 0.211*** 0.126** -0.003 -0.002 0.231*** 0.167**
(4.39) (2.54) (0.78) (1.55) (4.51) (2.32) (-0.06) (-0.03) (4.27) (2.27)
Gov. consump. -0.335* -0.439** -0.119 -0.016 -0.213 -0.418** -0.273 -0.202 -0.067 -0.287
(-1.94) (-1.98) (-0.78) (-0.09) (-1.50) (-2.41) (-1.60) (-0.92) (-0.39) (-1.44)
Trade openness 0.025* 0.072*** 0.023* 0.056*** 0.002 0.016 0.017 0.042* 0.008 0.027
(1.77) (3.28) (1.80) (2.68) (0.28) (0.96) (1.24) (1.90) (0.76) (1.50)
Inflation rate -0.064** -0.089** 0.024 0.003 -0.086*** -0.089*** 0.032 0.004 -0.095*** -0.108***
(-1.99) (-2.55) (1.09) (0.11) (-2.88) (-3.07) (1.06) (0.12) (-2.66) (-2.81)
Per-capita GDPt−1 (log) -9.451*** -10.963*** -8.603*** -11.573*** -0.834 0.607 -7.017*** -8.183*** -2.290 -3.318
(-4.23) (-3.67) (-4.69) (-4.93) (-0.43) (0.29) (-3.12) (-2.84) (-0.91) (-1.13)
EU membership 1.328*** 1.221** -0.570 -0.710* 1.846*** 1.892*** -0.731 -1.241** 1.983*** 2.404***
(2.81) (2.17) (-1.44) (-1.73) (4.22) (3.28) (-1.64) (-2.48) (3.48) (2.96)
Federal gov. -0.437 -2.870*** -0.197 -0.394 -0.236 -2.437*** -0.186 -0.259 -0.207 -2.464**
(-0.94) (-2.82) (-0.57) (-0.70) (-0.61) (-2.66) (-0.31) (-0.30) (-0.37) (-2.26)
R2 0.263 0.251 0.111 0.153 0.252 0.239 0.061 0.080 0.186 0.205
F -test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.029 0.000 0.000
KP-rk-LM p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
KP-rk-Wald F -statistic 50.42 36.00 70.95 37.60 56.30 35.03 26.25 38.01 21.61 35.47
Hansen-J -statistic 0.516 0.036 0.319 0.592 0.076 0.071 0.240 0.430 0.060 0.202
Group No 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Obs. No 540 347 540 347 540 347 525 332 525 332
Note: Instruments: the third and fourth order lagged values of fiscal decentralisation indicators in regressions (1)-(10); Standard errors robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
t-statistics in parenthesis. p-value is reported for the tests. Significant at level ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Table 8: The 2SLS estimation results with the alternative instruments
∆% GDP per-capita ∆% GDP per-worker ∆% Employment rate ∆% GDP per-hour worked ∆% Working hours per-capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Taxdec -0.003 -0.119*** 0.112*** -0.192*** 0.118*
(-0.07) (-2.89) (2.64) (-2.96) (1.70)
Taxaut 0.095 -0.099 0.194*** -0.129* 0.187**
(1.42) (-1.63) (2.93) (-1.90) (2.71)
Pop. growth -0.345 -0.263 -0.218 -0.152 -0.130 -0.123 -0.215 -0.264 -0.129 0.138
(-1.20) (-0.50) (-0.74) (-0.29) (-0.48) (-0.29) (-0.54) (-0.38) (-0.36) (0.22)
Fertility rate -3.741*** -2.849*** -0.869 -0.571 -2.766*** -2.160*** -0.211 -0.219 -3.006*** -2.837***
(-4.58) (-3.44) (-1.33) (-0.71) (-4.27) (-3.03) (-0.22) (-0.20) (-3.81) (-3.25)
Schoolingt−1 0.693 3.028* 1.367 1.155 -0.686 1.788 1.436 1.472 -0.718 1.669
(0.57) (1.66) (1.37) (0.82) (-0.61) (1.22) (1.20) (0.99) (-0.53) (0.92)
Investment ratio 0.210*** 0.174*** 0.016 0.045 0.191*** 0.127*** -0.020 -0.017 0.221*** 0.160**
(4.25) (2.72) (0.44) (0.93) (4.74) (2.83) (-0.45) (-0.31) (4.53) (2.64)
Gov. consump. -0.385** -0.490** -0.089 -0.013 -0.288** -0.472*** -0.172 -0.026 -0.111 -0.360*
(-2.46) (-2.22) (-0.61) (-0.07) (-2.16) (-2.89) (-1.07) (-0.13) (-0.67) (-1.87)
Trade openness 0.026** 0.075*** 0.028** 0.056*** -0.002 0.019 0.020 0.047** 0.002 0.023
(2.05) (4.47) (2.33) (3.24) (-0.24) (1.34) (1.54) (2.27) (0.24) (1.499
Inflation rate -0.045* -0.052* 0.052** 0.038 -0.095*** -0.087*** 0.046* 0.020 -0.098*** -0.098**
(-1.73) (-1.88) (2.44) (1.49) (-3.55) (-3.46) (1.65) (0.77) (-3.00) (-3.07)
Per-capita GDPt−1 (log) -8.290*** -8.305*** -8.716*** -10.101*** 0.446 1.784 -7.535*** -7.760*** -1.271 -1.890
(-4.62) (-3.82) (-5.30) (-4.88) (0.27) (0.92) (-3.66) (-3.06) (-0.56) (-0.75)
EU membership 0.822* 1.142** -0.839* -0.504 1.611*** 1.613*** -0.541 -1.178** 1.692*** 2.220***
(1.70) (2.23) (-1.85) (-1.19) (3.68) (3.09) (-1.28) (-2.56) (3.42) (3.48)
Federal gov. -0.267 -2.553*** -0.133 0.151 -0.135 -2.687*** -0.056 0.539 -0.128 -2.723**
(-0.58) (-2.76) (-0.34) (0.22) (-0.37) (-2.66) (-0.09) (0.56) (-0.24) (-2.43)
R2 0.223 0.246 0.079 0.129 0.232 0.246 -0.000 0.061 0.175 0.201
F -test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000
KP-rk-LM p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
KP-rk-Wald F-statistic 26.37 11.28 42.64 15.39 31.91 12.64 23.18 15.92 17.12 15.92
Hansen-J -statistic 0.441 0.597 0.114 0.192 0.424 0.410 0.404 0.242 0.407 0.368
Group No 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Obs. No 600 409 600 409 600 409 570 379 570 379
Note: Standard errors robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. t-statistics in parenthesis. p-value is reported for the tests. Significant at level ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Table 9: The 2SLS estimation results with tax decentralistaion measures and alternative instruments filtered by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) method
∆% GDP per-capita ∆% GDP per-worker ∆% Employment rate ∆% GDP per-hour worked ∆% Working hours per-capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Taxdec-hp 0.001 -0.121*** 0.117*** -0.177*** 0.112*
(0.03) (-2.98) (2.84) (-2.88) (1.70)
Taxaut-hp 0.125* -0.086 0.210*** -0.084 0.177***
(1.88) (-1.51) (3.37) (-1.23) (2.59)
R2 0.225 0.238 0.090 0.149 0.235 0.257 0.025 0.083 0.181 0.217
F -test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
KP-rk-LM p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
KP-rk-Wald F -statistic 30.73 13.44 52.68 19.31 38.01 15.32 30.17 20.37 21.67 20.37
Hansen-J -statistic 0.449 0.795 0.228 0.276 0.654 0.361 0.708 0.232 0.677 0.316
Group No 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Obs. No 600 420 600 420 600 420 570 390 570 390
Note: Standard errors robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. t-statistics in parenthesis. p-value is reported for the tests. Significant at level ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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